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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAGE ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
THE OHIO CASUALTY GROUP 
OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
a Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction as a case 
transferred from the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
Plaintiff ("Page"), subcontractor, brought suit against the 
bonding company of the general contractor ("Ohio Casualty") for 
balances due on three construction projects. 
B. Course of Proceedings, 
After a bench trial, the court made findings and entered 
judgment against Ohio Casualty for an amount less than that 
claimed by Page. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Page agrees with part of the statement of facts in Ohio 
Casualty's brief, and disputes or supplements the statements 
1 
Case No. 93-0328-CA 
Priority No. 15 
using the same paragraph numbers and headings. 
1. Glendon's Subcontracts with Page Electric. 
Page responded to Glendon's request for proposal for 
electrical work on the construction of a smaller Autozone store 
at Bountiful, and larger store at Murray and Orem, Utah by 
unsigned letter dated April 16, 1990 addressed to Glendon which 
stated: 
"PROPOSAL: Auto Zone 
Dear Ted, 
Install electrical to small building $7190.00 
Owner to furnish all fixtures, lamps and switch 
gear 
Install electrical to large building $9420.00 
Owner to furnish all fixtures, lamps and switch 
gear 
If we can be of further help, please call. Thanks for 
the opportunity." 
The proposed total for the three jobs was $26,030.00. (P.Ex.1). 
The trial court stated in findings from the bench that 
Glendon received the proposals, and responded that Page was the 
low bidder and that all parties contemplated that there would be 
some change orders during construction. The trial court also 
stated that Page commenced work at Bountiful on August 30, and 
performed the last work on October 29, 1990; commenced at Murray 
on September 5, and performed the last work on December 3, 1990; 
and commenced at Orem on September 4, and performed the last work 
on December 4, 1990. (R35). As to the existence of a contract 
the court stated: 
There was never any written agreement between the 
plaintiffs and Glendon Corporation. However, it's 
clear that these parties had a meeting of the mind at 
least as to the basic contract price and what was to be 
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paid in that regard, and they further agreed that there 
would be changes and that those would be expected to be 
carried out by these plaintiffs. It's unclear what the 
agreement was between the parties on how that was to be 
conducted. (R36,69). 
Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the court's Findings of Fact (R67-
69) are to the effect that the bid proposal, its acceptance by 
Glendon and the performance thereunder constituted the contracts 
between the parties and there was no formal subcontract signed by 
either party. The green "Subcontract Agreement" (D.Ex.ll) was 
sent to Page but was never signed by either party because of some 
difference between that agreement and the bid (R246). 
The court analyzed the performance including change orders, 
allowed some change orders, disallowed others and deducted for 
items not performed, and then made a finding of the reasonable 
value of the performance of the bid as follows: 
"A summary of charges and credits on the three stores is as 
follows: 
Bountiful Stores: 
Reasonable value of performance of bid $7,190.00 
Less heat tape. -891.30 
Net $6,298.70 
Murray Store: 
Reasonable value of performance of bid $9,420.00 
Power to Yard lights $1,380.00 less $316.00 1,064.00 
Extra roof top unit 670.00 
Rerouting conduit to sign 153.00 
Repairs to defective lighting 338.47 
Deduction $1, 331.30 
Net $10,428.47 
Orem Store: 
Reasonable value of performance of bid $9,420.00 
Extra roof top unit 670.00 
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Repairs to defective lighting 338.47 
$10,428.47 
Less credit to Glendon: 
Heating tape $891.30 
Uncompleted work $215.00 -1,106.30 
Net $9,322.17 
Total amount due Plaintiff: $25,935.04 
11. The plaintiff has not been paid any amount 
other than reimbursement for the temporary power. The 
part payment by checks reciting payment in full were 
properly refused by the plaintiff, and the lien waivers 
were without consideration and of no effect. 
12. The Court finds that the defendant surety 
agreed to indemnify and pay over on behalf of Glendon 
any sums due and owing pursuant to the contracts which 
were not paid by Glendon but not exceeding the contract 
amounts. The Court finds that the additions agreed to 
by the parties are included as contracts amounts. (R70-
71) . 
Glendon7s employee, Cromer, testified that Page's charges were a 
"good value". 
2. Liquidated Damages and Additional Damages 
Glendon quoted from the "prime contract" between Glendon and 
Autozone as providing for a $300.00 per day liquidated damages 
for late completion. No copy of the prime contract was provided 
to Page who received only those sheets of the plans relating to 
electrical work (R213). 
Page objected to admission of evidence regarding the 
liquidated damages assessed against Glendon for the reason that 
Page did not sign any agreement relating to liquidated damages 
(R333). However, the court overruled the objection and received 
the documents because "The Court finds it goes to notice." 
(R334). At the close of the trial the court stated in its bench 
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findings: 
The Court finds that these plaintiffs were aware 
of the penalty which was in effect on these particular 
stores and liquidated damages which could be imposed. 
However, in light of the extras that were charged 
relative to the Murray store, there is no indication 
that the extra days were in fact used in doing those 
extras or in some other way, and therefore the Court 
denies any liquidated damages apportioned to these 
plaintiffs in this particular case. 
There was no evidence that Page caused any delays. Glendon's 
employee, Lefler said they determined how many days Page was 
given to do the job compared to the number of days on the job and 
assessed the difference as "delay days." (R336). However, on 
cross examination, Lefler could not specify any delays, he just 
knew that Page was scheduled for nine days on the Murray job and 
was there twenty-one days He admitted that realistically Page 
could not work nine days straight because of having to coordinate 
with the progress of other subcontractors (R362), and Lefler did 
not know of any instance where Page failed to perform timely with 
respect to other subcontractors (R363). 
3. Page Electrics Extra Charges for Replacing Damaged or 
Defective Ballasts. 
There was conflicting evidence as to the charge of $338.47 
for defective ballasts supplied by Autozone. The court resolved 
the matter in its bench findings: (R38) 
The Court would further find that under the terms 
of the contract documents, it was agreed that Autozone 
would furnish certain fixtures. Those fixtures 
included the lighting fixtures, that any expenditures 
made in replacing those that were defective were proper 
change orders and those sums should be awarded to the 
plaintiff in the amount I believe on the Murray job of 
I think it was $338. The Court finds all other items 
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claimed by the plaintiffs in that job were readily 
ascertainable from the contract documents. 
4. Glendon/s Tender of Payment to Page Electric. 
The three checks issued by Glendon to Page were less than 
the amount invoiced (R398) and each check stub recited a 10% 
retainage. Glen Adams, president of Glendon, admitted that the 
three checks were based upon an October 25th billing and not the 
larger November 7th billing, and that the checks were dated 
December 10, 1990. He did not contact Page to advise that they 
could alter the endorsement and cash the checks. No other checks 
were issued and Glendon had the use of the money all of that time 
(R285-286). 
5. Rulings by the Trial Court. 
The rulings of the trial court are better stated by the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached to the 
Appellant's brief and contained in the record (R66-72) and the 
bench ruling (R32-46). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
Prejudgment interest was properly awarded by the court in 
this action on contract for services and materials in building 
construction projects since the amount was calculated with 
mathematical accuracy on items found to have been performed. 
There was no unconditional tender of full payment which would 
interrupt the running of interest and all offers of payment were 
less than payment in full. 
II, BONDING COMPANY'S LIABILITY FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
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Whenever a penalty on a bond becomes a debt due and payable, 
the surety is as much liable for interest thereon as if the 
surety had been the original debtor. 
III. THERE WAS NO SIGNED WRITTEN CONTRACT. 
Ohio Casualty's claim that Page was bound by the provisions 
of a "green" Subcontract Agreement was resolved by the court's 
finding that no such agreement was ever signed by either party. 
The parties acted upon a bid proposal and its informal 
acceptance, which formed the basis of the court's findings as to 
performance and entitlement to compensation. 
IV. NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THESE PARTIES 
CONTAINED A CLAUSE FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. 
There was no signed agreement between Page as subcontractor 
and Glendon as general contractor for liquidated damages penalty 
for delays of performance. The court found no evidence that Page 
caused any delays or agreed to liquidated damages. Page 
performed all work within a three month term specified in 
unsigned documents. 
V. THE AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT WAS 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The findings of the court as to amounts due came after a 
review of the evidence wherein Page claimed more to be due and 
Ohio Casualty claimed less to be due than found by the court. 
Ohio Casualty does not marshal1 the evidence to show that the 
court's findings were clearly erroneous. 
VI. NO OBJECTION WAS RAISED TO THE COURTS 
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REQUEST THAT COUNSEL FORGO CLOSING ARGUMENTS. 
Ohio Casualty interrupted the court's bench recitation of 
finding to interject expressions as to certain items of the 
award. At the close of the court's presentation, parties were 
asked by the court if there were matters which the court had not 
resolved, to which Ohio Casualty's counsel responded "None that I 
can think of right now, your Honor." Ohio Casualty also utilized 
several post trial proceedings to further advise the court of its 
arguments. In a nonjury trial, the granting or denial of closing 
argument is within the discretion of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST ALTHOUGH PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD HAVE 
COMMENCED AT AN EARLIER DATE THAN AWARDED. 
The court found that "[t]he three jobs were substantially 
completed by the early part of December, although the Bountiful 
store was substantially completed October 29th so far as the 
plaintiff was concerned." (R69). However, the court allowed 
interest only from the following January 21, 1991. The Supreme 
Court of Utah in the case of Jorgensen v. John Clary Co. 660 P.2d 
229 (Utah 1983) at page 233 held: 
INTEREST 
Prejudgment interest may be awarded in a case where 
the loss is fixed as of a particular time and the 
amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy. 
Buyer's argument that this is not such a case is 
unpersuasive. This is not an instance such as a case 
involving personal injury, false imprisonment, wrongful 
death, defamation, or the like. Regardless of 
variability of the weight of the sheep, these damages 
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were mathematically calculated. The jury awarded 
seller damages based upon the difference between what 
seller should have received under the contract with 
buyer and what he actually received from R.H. Rock 
Company as of the date of last delivery. Seller was 
entitled to interest on that difference. We find no 
error on this point. 
citations omitted. 
The three checks issued by Glendon dated December 10, 1990, 
were for amounts invoiced on October 25, 1990, less 10% 
retainage, whereas a full payment would have required the amounts 
billed on November 7, 1990, which were substantially larger 
amounts (R398). Glendon did not advise Page to alter the 
endorsement which would have acknowledged payment in full and did 
not unconditionally subsequently offer payment of any kind until 
litigation commenced By Offer of Judgment dated December 31, 
1991, Ohio Casualty offered to allow judgment to be taken against 
it by Page in the amount of $22,243.33 with costs accrued to date 
(Rll) and a subsequent Offer of Judgment dated May 26, 1992, in 
the amount of $25,000.00. No funds were ever deposited in court. 
The court made specific findings on the claimed tender. 
The Court finds that no payments were made on 
these jobs until the middle of December of 1990, 
although prior billings had been made to the defendant 
—excuse me, to the Glendon Corporation, that at that 
time there had arisen between the parties a dispute as 
to whether in fact, at least in plaintiffs' mind, they 
were going to be paid. The check submitted to them 
clearly provided for a release of lien of all sums due 
and owing up to a certain date. The Court finds that 
the plaintiffs had good reason at that point to send 
those checks back, that Glendon Corporation made no 
effort to contact the plaintiffs from the plaintiff's 
statement, although there is a conflict in testimony, 
and to work out those payments and the release of lien 
provisions. The Court finds that any release of liens 
which were granted by Mr. Merlin Page in this matter 
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were granted in consideration of payment and since no 
payment was forthcoming were without consideration. 
(R41). 
The blanks left in the stamped form of endorsement were more 
appropriately to be filled in by the maker of the check and not 
entrusted to the payee to choose whatever date the payee selected 
and if left blank would lead to more uncertainty and ambiguity as 
to what was being released. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in the case of Seiverts v. 
White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974, 978 (1954) that: 
A tender, to be good, must be free from any condition 
which the tenderer does not have a right to insist 
upon. The plaintiffs here had no right to insist upon 
delivery of a deed as a condition to their making a 
tender of the purchase price. 
A tender must be made in good faith and in such a 
manner as to most likely, under the circumstances, 
benefit the creditor. In this case plaintiffs insisted 
upon the defendants meeting their convenience by coming 
to their office to receive a tender of a check which 
had insufficient funds to cover it." 
citations omitted. 
At no time did Glendon tender the full amount due. Glendon had 
in its possession three Subcontractor's Release of Lien, 
Defendant's Exhibits 22, 23 and 24 dated 11-12-90, signed by 
Merlin W. Page and notarized, which recited under oath that "Page 
Electric has completed all the work and furnished materials 
necessary" for the Autozone stores, which releases were presented 
as a condition to payment. Glendon had these releases in its 
possession at the time the three checks were issued which 
required a full payment and release of lien endorsement. 
In view of the disputed amounts due, change orders, 
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retention of 10% and no clarification of the date which was to be 
filled in on the endorsement, Page was justly apprehensive of the 
endorsement which could be construed as a final release, 
particularly once Glendon did not return the lien waivers and as 
shown by later offers, never intended to honor the invoices. 
Glen Adams testified that his employee, Steven Broadhead, 
related to him that Steve and Merlin Page had discussions over 
the three checks and they "blatantly refused them" (R400). Each 
of the three checks, Defendant's Exhibits 22, 23 and 24 are 
stamped on the face thereof as having been received back by 
Glendon, February 7, 1991. The evidence supports the court's 
findings, and the defendant has not marshalled the evidence to 
refute the findings. As stated by the Supreme Court in Scharf v. 
BMG Corp. 700 P.2d 1068, (Utah 1985): 
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's 
findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. Erickson has not 
begun to carry that heavy burden. Nowhere does he 
marshal the evidence supporting his version of the 
facts, much less the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings. Under these circumstances, we 
decline to further consider Erickson's attack on the 
factual findings. 
citations omitted. 
On review, the appellate court is not limited to the written 
findings and may properly examine findings expressed from the 
bench or contained in other court documents or memoranda. 
Merriam v. Merriam 799 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah Ct. App 1990). 
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II. OHIO CASUALTY IS EQUALLY LIABLE FOR PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST AS GLENDON. 
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 relating to bonds required on 
private contract provides in part: 
§ 14-2-1(3) 
The payment bond shall be with a surety or sureties 
satisfactory to the owner for the protection of all 
persons supplying labor, services, equipment, or 
material in the prosecution of the work provided for in 
the contract in a sum equal to the contract price. 
§ 14-2-1(4) 
A person shall have a right of action on a payment 
bond under this chapter for any unpaid amount due him 
if: 
(a) he has furnished labor, services, equipment, 
or material in the prosecution of the work provided for 
the contract for which the payment bond is furnished 
under this chapter; and 
(b) he has not been paid in full within 90 days 
after the last day on which he performed the labor or 
service or supplied the equipment or material for which 
the claim is made. 
If Ohio Casualty had paid the contract price when due, there 
would not have been any interest charged. The obligation of a 
surety to pay interest is stated in 74 Am. Jur. 2d 116, 
Suretyship Section 116: 
§ 166. Interest. 
Whenever the penalty on a bond becomes a debt due and 
payable as to the surety, he is as much liable for 
interest thereon as if he had been originally the 
principal debtor, not, however, as a part of the debt 
for which he become responsible, but as damages for its 
detention, and it is immaterial that the allowance of 
interest may make the judgment in excess of the penalty 
named in the bond. Under this rule, when the bond is 
breached, the penalty to the amount of the damages 
immediately becomes the debt of the surety and bears 
interest the same as any other debt on contract, if the 
principal claim bears interest. This has been said to 
be the rule irrespective of the fact that no demand was 
made on the surety, and regardless of the fact that the 
surety had no notice of the principal's default. 
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Evidence was presented that the bonding company responded to 
Page's previous correspondence relative to payment by a letter 
from Ohio Casualty dated April 24, 1991 (R256-257). 
III. THE ONLY WRITTEN-SIGNED CONTRACT WAS THE BID PROPOSAL. 
Ohio refers to its Exhibit 21 attached to its brief as 
Addendum "E" as being a binding enforceable contract. However, 
the exhibit, entitled Subcontractor Pre-Qualification Form, is 
primarily instructional and states that "The acceptance by 
Glendon Corporation for this quotation shall create a binding and 
enforceable Contract of Sale, dating from the time of said 
acceptance . . . ." The proposal which Glendon accepted from 
Page is Plaintiff's Exhibit #1 which was unsigned and stated: 
April 16, 1990 
Glendon Corporation 
450 East 1000 North 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
PROPOSAL: Auto Zone 
Dear Ted, 
Install electrical to small building $7190.00 
Owner to furnish all fixtures, lamps and switch 
gear 
Install electrical to large building $9420.00 
Owner to furnish all fixtures, lamps and switch 
gear 
If we can be of further help, please call. Thanks for 
the opportunity. 
The above proposal was accepted by Glendon by exhibits #4 and #5 
which are not signed and make no mention of the "green" 
Subcontract Agreement, Exhibit #11 which shows a date of June 20, 
1990, and was never signed by either party. There was no mention 
of change orders or penalties for delays in the proposal, the 
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acceptance nor the pre-qualification form, and while such matters 
were included in part in the "green" Subcontract Agreement, the 
latter was never signed nor in existence at the time of the 
proposal and acceptance. The trial court's finding contained in 
paragraph 10 that "[t]here was never any written agreement 
between plaintiff and Glendon Corporation" is fully supported by 
the evidence. 
IV. THERE WAS NO LIQUIDATED DAMAGE CLAUSE IN ANY 
AGREEMENT SIGNED BY EITHER PARTY. 
As reviewed above, the only document signed by Page was the 
Subcontractor Pre-Qualification Form (Defendant's Exhibit #21), 
which makes no mention of time of performance. The acceptance of 
the Page proposal by Glendon, Defendant's Ex. #5, makes a 
reference to time as follows: "Length of Duration 3 months to 
your schedule." 
The court found that Page supplied the first labor and 
materials on the Bountiful store on August 30, 1990 and the last 
work on October 29, 1990 and found the first work on the Murray 
store to be September 5, 1990, and the last on December 4, 1990, 
and that the three jobs were substantially completed by the early 
part of December. Accordingly the performance by Page was within 
the three month "Length of Duration." There was no evidence that 
Page caused any delays in the progress of the construction. 
V. THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTED THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT 
AND MORE. 
There was evidence supporting each item of award. Ohio 
Casualty acknowledges in its brief that there was such evidence 
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but contends the dispute should have been resolved in its favor. 
"Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibilities of the witness." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the great 
weight of the evidence or if the court is otherwise definitely 
and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
Page contends that its judgment should have been greater in 
that the court allowed deductions of $2,673.90 for heating tapes 
claimed by Page to be extras; refused to allow an extra charge of 
$418.66 for extending a conduit for a telephone line; and should 
have allowed the extra charge of $271.44 for extra elbows and 
installation. 
VI. NO OBJECTION WAS RAISED TO THE COURT'S REQUEST 
THAT COUNSEL FORGO CLOSING ARGUMENTS. 
After both parties had rested, and late on the second day of 
trial, the court stated: "Well, in light of the hour, Counsel, I 
am going to ask you to forgo closing arguments and I will rule on 
the matter for you so you can have it resolved." (R435). No 
objection was raised by counsel for either party. During the 
course of the court's bench findings, Mr. Griffin interrupted the 
court on the matter of the heat tapes and temporary power items 
(R441) then at record reflects at R-444 the following closing 
comments: 
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Mr. Fadel, you are to prepare findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in accordance with my ruling. You 
are to submit the same to Mr. Griffin at least five 
days before they are submitted to me for signature. 
Are there any matters that I should have resolved 
which I have not, Mr. Fadel, that you are aware of? 
MR. FADEL: I think not, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Griffin, any that you can think of 
that I have not resolved? 
MR. GRIFFIN: None that I can think of right nowf 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, If there is a problem, get 
on a conference call, either one of you, with the Court 
and we will resolve those for you. Let's make sure we 
have got all of the exhibits in this matter. 
When Mr. Griffin stated that there were no items he could 
think of at the time that were not resolved, he effectively 
waived any additional argument. The trial concluded on June 10, 
1992. On June 25, 1992, Glendon filed a Notice of Objections to 
Findings, Conclusions, Judgment and Attorney Fee Affidavit (R45-
50). The clerk sent a notice setting the matter for oral 
argument on July 21, 1992 (R58). Counsel for both parties 
appeared on July 21, 1992 at which time the court reduced the 
attorney fee award and the minute entry further states, "Findings 
and Order are to be corrected as outlined by the Court. If there 
are objections a conference call is to be made to the Court." 
(R62). 
On August 14, 1992, Ohio Casualty filed Motion to Amend 
Findings and Judgment Or, In the Alternative, For a New Trial 
(R757) together with a Memorandum In Support of The Motion To 
Amend Findings And Judgment Or, In The Alternative, For a New 
Trial (R77-83) wherein Ohio Casualty fully detailed its 
arguments. On August 31, 1992, Ohio Casualty filed a four page 
16 
"Defendant's Reply Memorandum" (R95-98). Page filed a Notice To 
Submit For Decision on January 19, 1993 (R100). The court issued 
its ruling on Ohio Casualty's motion of August 14, 1992, by the 
following Minute Entry dated and signed January 18, 1993: 
Comes now the Court and having reviewed 
defendant's motion to amend findings and judgment or in 
the alternative for a new trial and the memorandum in 
support thereof and plaintiff's memorandum in 
opposition thereto and the pleadings in the file and 
the court's notes of the hearing herein, the Court 
hereby denies defendant's motion. The Court finding 
that the Findings and Conclusions heretofore made by 
the Court are adequately supported by the evidence and 
that counsel had adequate time to present their 
respective cases during the course of the trial. 
Defendant's counsel is to prepare Findings and 
Order in accordance with the Court's ruling, submit the 
same to opposing counsel at least five days prior to 
the time it is submitted to the Court for signature. 
Dated this 18th day of January, 1993. 
The only case cited by Ohio Casualty on the issue of denial 
of closing arguments, DeJohn v. American Estate Life Insurance 
Company. 489 P.2d 1065 (Colo. App. 1971) held: 
As a third argument, defendant contends that the 
trial court erred in refusing to permit it the right to 
present argument at the close of the case. This 
ruling, it is claimed, denied defendant the right to 
present legal argument to the court which might have 
swayed its opinion. 
We, however, consider this an area of discretion with 
the trial court. Defendant was not denied the right to 
give the trial court the benefit of its thinking on the 
legal theories involved since such arguments were 
properly presented in the motion for new trial and were 
rejected by the trial court. 
Having declined further comment following the court's bench 
findings, and persisting in written objections thereafter which 
protracted finalization of the judgment for six months, Ohio 
Casualty's claim of error in denying closing argument is 
17 
unfounded. 
CONCLUSION 
Ohio Casualty has been credited with more deductions than 
were indicated by the evidence and has taken advantage of liberal 
post trial proceedings to expand upon its position. The judgment 
was more than fair to Ohio Casualty. 
The judgment should be affirmed and the cause remanded to 
the trial court to assess attorney fees on appeal and costs. 
DATED this 22nd day of September, 1993. 
X Gfeorge/K. Fadel 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I mailed two copies of this Reply Brief to Mr. Ronald E. 
Griffin, attorney for the appellant, Walker Center, Suite 700, 
175 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utj^ h, 84111 this 22nd day 
of September, 1993. 
CsPy^ 
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PAGE ELECTRIC 
***This information must be returned 
to Glendon Corporation within 5 days 
of receipt in order to complete 
subcontract agreements and avoid 
contract delay* * * 
The bid for ........ KJJECIUU^LL _.___that you submitted to 
Glendon Corporation regarding work en the AUTOZONE INC.- Orem Store 
project; is fh»* apparent low bid. We need to receive vital 
information for contract documents and project scheduling prior to 
the signing of a contract between you and Glendon Corporation. 
The enclosed Required Contractor Information form must be filled 
out completely and returned to Glendon Corporation offices. If 
this information ha«; already been submitted, you may want to 
confirm that the corporate office has 'received it so as not to 
del ay yoin" cont raet . 
If: you arc required to provide submittals or shop drawings, please 
start this process now. This will insure that your phase or phases 
ol* the project; are completed in the appropriate time frame arid 
without delay to the project. 
Glendon Corporation has several project plans. If your trade 
requires it's own set. of plans, please check with our office for 
pi r,n avai 1 abi 1 i ty . 
in addition to the above mentioned information the following is 
also necessary to complete the scheduling for the project: 
Phase of work Length of Duration Days of Delay 
(Due to shAppincj etc.) 
IP. 9. n t h s l- o y o u r 
s c h e d u l e o w n e r f u r n i s h i n g a .11 e q u i p n 
a n d f i x t u r e s 
**N0TF;** We (\o not guarantee the above phases and durations are 
final. However, we will do all possible to allow 
sufficient time to complete each phase. Exact duration 
and phases wi 1 1 be determined upon scheduling completion. 
hnlon^ymtion 
e l e c t r i c a l 
